Fixation probabilities for the Moran process in evolutionary games with
  two strategies: graph shapes and large population asymptotics by Souza, Evandro P. et al.
Fixation probabilities for the Moran process in
evolutionary games with two strategies: graph
shapes and large population asymptotics ∗
Evandro P. Souza1
Eliza M. Ferreira2
Armando G. M. Neves1
1Departamento de Matema´tica, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais,
2Departamento de Cieˆncias Exatas, Universidade Federal de Lavras
aneves@mat.ufmg.br
April 30, 2018
Abstract
This paper is based on the complete classification of evolutionary
scenarios for the Moran process with two strategies given by Taylor
et al. (B. Math. Biol. 66(6): 1621–1644, 2004). Their classification
is based on whether each strategy is a Nash equilibrium and whether
the fixation probability for a single individual of each strategy is larger
or smaller than its value for neutral evolution. We improve on this
analysis by showing that each evolutionary scenario is characterized
by a definite graph shape for the fixation probability function. A sec-
ond class of results deals with the behavior of the fixation probability
when the population size tends to infinity. We develop asymptotic
formulae that approximate the fixation probability in this limit and
conclude that some of the evolutionary scenarios cannot exist when
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the population size is large. Keywords: Markov chains – Asymptotic
analysis – Birth death processes
1 Introduction
The Moran process [13] was introduced as a stochastic model for the genetic
evolution of a haploid population with asexual reproduction, assuming no
mutations, and fixed finite size. An important feature of the Moran process
– and other similar stochastic evolutionary processes for finite populations –
is fixation: with probability 1, at a finite time the whole population will be
made of a single type of individuals. This is a consequence of the finiteness
of the population and of the no mutations assumption.
The subject of fixation in evolutionary processes in finite populations,
using either the Moran process or others, has received a good deal of attention
in recent publications, see e.g.[5], [6], [23], [4] and [7]. In all of the above and
most others, the population is composed of only two types of individuals, say
type A and type B, where A and B may stand for particular alleles at some
genetic locus, or phenotypes. Some papers dealing with cases of populations
with more than two types are [12],[8] and [22].
In this paper we will restrict only to the case in which the population is
composed of just two types of individuals. We will suppose the population
has a fixed sized and use symbol N for the number of individuals in it. For
the Moran process for a population with two types it is possible to obtain
exact results for some quantities of interest [9]. One such quantity is the type
A fixation probability pii, i.e. the probability that the population becomes
all A, given that the initial state is i A individuals and N − i B individuals,
i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}. Such an exact result is not available either for the Moran
process if the number of types of individuals in the population is larger than
two, or for other processes in Population Genetics, such as Wright-Fisher.
The Moran process was originally introduced for the case in which the
fitness of the individuals in the population depends on the individual’s type
(A or B), but not on the frequency of that type in the population. In [15],
[20] it was extended to the case of Evolutionary Game Theory [11], [10], [14],
in which fitnesses depend on the frequency in which the types are present in
the population. In the context of Game Theory, the types of individuals are
commonly referred to as strategies.
At first, Evolutionary Game Theory was intended as a theory for infinite
2
populations with a deterministic dynamics [21], [10]. An important applica-
tion of this approach is the study of models for the evolution of cooperation
[16], [17]. For the deterministic replicator dynamics and populations with
two strategies, there exist 4 possible generic (or robust, see [24]) dynamical
behaviors: dominance of A, dominance of B, coordination and hawk-dove.
The above classification depends on whether the pure strategies A and B are
Nash equilibria.
The Moran process, on the other hand, allows for the possibility of random
fluctuations, as expected for finite populations. It happens that the result
of the evolutionary process is not always the fixation of the fittest type.
[20] elucidated in a clear way the important role played by the population
size N in the outcome of evolution in the game theoretical Moran process.
They also noticed that taking into account the random nature of the Moran
process led to a further complexity step necessary to classify the dynamics of
a population.Their classification scheme takes into account not only whether
the pure strategies A and B are Nash equilibria. It considers also whether the
fixation probabilities ρA ≡ pi1 of a single A individual in a population of N−1
B individuals and its analogue ρB ≡ 1−piN−1 are larger or smaller than 1/N .
Here 1/N appears as the fixation probability for the neutral Moran process
[14], see Section 2 for precise definitions. In principle, the possible number of
evolutionary scenarios for the Moran process in a population with two types
of individuals is 16. An important result in [20] is that only 8 out of the 16
scenarios are allowed to exist. We stress that the classification scheme of [20]
takes into account ρA and ρB, i.e. the values of the fixation probabilities pii
for only two values of i, namely i = 1 and i = N − 1.
As already remarked, an explicit exact formula for pii exists, see (12).
Despite that, the formula is “unwieldy”, as remarked in [9], and this un-
wieldiness is the reason for this paper. One result we will show is that given
the evolutionary scenario as classified by [20], we can deduce properties of pii
for the remaining values i = 2, 3, . . . , N−2. More than that, we can associate
with each evolutionary scenario a precise shape for the graph of the pii as a
function of i. We will see e.g. that the pii graph may either lie entirely above
the neutral line pii = i/N , or entirely below it, or is allowed to intercept it
only once, each of the above possibilities being associated with some of the
possible scenarios. We will also show that a single “inflection point” will
exist for some scenarios and no inflections will be allowed for some other
scenarios. In this analysis, instead of using the exact formula for the pii, we
will use the discrete derivative of pii, which obeys a much simpler equation.
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A second class of results in the present paper deals with another gap in
the analysis of [20]. In fact, reading the above paper, we felt that some anal-
ysis was missing on the relation between what happens for large N and the
corresponding deterministic N = ∞ case. We will prove e.g. that for large
population sizes N only 5 out of the 8 evolutionary scenarios are generically
admissible. More precisely, we will show that if we fix the pay-off matrix of
the game and the intensity of selection w, see Section 2 for precise definitions,
then for large enough N only some of the evolutionary scenarios are allowed.
The tools we developed for this second part of the paper are asymptotic
formulas for pii when the fraction i/N of A individuals is held fixed and
N →∞. As we shall see, the starting point of the argument is identifying a
certain sum as a Riemann sum and approximating it when N →∞ with the
corresponding integral. It seems to us that this idea was discovered by [2],
but they used it only as a non-rigorous approximation. Despite that, they
are able to obtain qualitatively correct asymptotic results for the fixation
probabilities ρA and ρB of a single mutant. Sometimes their approximation
can lead to quantitatively correct results, too. They also study the question
of fixation times, an issue not at all addressed in this paper.
[6] presented a rigorous theory in which the just mentioned integral is
called the “fitness potential”. They define “suitable birth and death pro-
cesses”, a class which contains the Moran process, and prove for these pro-
cesses an interesting theorem in which the fixation probabilities are asymp-
totically calculated as N →∞ in terms of the fitness potential. In the class
of suitable processes there is a wealth of interesting cases where the inten-
sity of selection depends on N , but unfortunately the case which interests
us, i.e. the intensity of selection w independent of N , does not match their
suitability hypotheses.
We believe that one reason why both [2] and [6] did not obtain all of our
present results is that replacing the integral by a Riemann sum produces a
“continuation” error term that does not tend to 0 as N → ∞. We obtain
asymptotic formulae both for the main contribution to the fixation proba-
bility, i.e. the one individuated by [2], and also for the continuation error.
As a consequence, we will see that some of the evolutionary scenarios are
forbidden for large enough N .
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will review the Moran
process as defined in [20], but adding the possibility of a weak-selection
regime, not accounted for in that work, although present in the contem-
porary paper [15] by the same authors. We will also explain the notations
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and derive again the 8 possible evolutionary scenarios. The graph shapes for
the fixation probability functions in each scenario are derived in Section 3.
The general formulation of the asymptotics for large N problem is presented
in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 deal with the asymptotic results for the par-
ticular scenarios. In Section 7 we draw some conclusions and suggest some
lines to be followed in future works. Some of the lengthier proofs are found
in Appendix A.
Before anything else, we introduce for definiteness some not so much
standard notation to be used in this paper. First of all, when we talk about
asymptoticity, it will always be in the infinite population limit N → ∞,
where N is the number of individuals. We say that two functions f and g
are asymptotic, denoted f ∼ g, if limN→∞ f(N)/g(N) = 1. We will write
f = o(g) if f(N)/g(N)→ 0 when N →∞. If f(N)/g(N) is bounded when
N →∞, we write f = O(g).
We define also QN = { iN ; i ∈ Z}. If x ∈ R, then [Nx] denotes the integer
closest to Nx. Of course, for x ∈ QN , [Nx] = Nx.
2 Background on the Moran process and no-
tation
We will use the same notation as in [15] for the Moran process and fitnesses.
Let N be the number of individuals in a population. Each individual may
be either of type (or strategy) A or type B. For the sake of numbering rows
and columns of the pay-off matrix, types A and B will be indexed as types 1
and 2, respectively.
The game-theoretic pay-off matrix is
P =
(
a b
c d
)
, (1)
with a, b, c and d all positive. The matrix element in row k and column ` is
the pay-off for an individual of type k interacting with an individual of type
`. Considering the mean-field hypothesis that individuals interact with all
others, but not with themselves, the game-theoretic pay-off for A individuals
in a situation in which there are i individuals of type A and N− i individuals
of type B in the population is
a
i− 1
N − 1 + b
N − i
N − 1 .
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Here i−1
N−1 is the fraction of A individuals other than the one receiving the pay-
off in the remainder of the population and N−i
N−1 is the corresponding fraction
of B individuals. By an analogous argument the game-theoretic pay-off for
B individuals is
c
i
N − 1 + d
N − i− 1
N − 1 .
In Evolutionary Game Theory, the game theoretic pay-off is considered to
be part of individuals’ fitness, i.e. a contribution to the size of their offspring.
Other than the game-theoretic pay-off, we consider as in [15] that the fitness
of each individual has another term which is equal for all individuals in the
population. Summing both terms, when the population has i A and N − i
B individuals we define the fitness of the A’s as
fi = 1− w + w [a i− 1
N − 1 + b
N − i
N − 1] (2)
and the fitness of B’s as
gi = 1− w + w [c i
N − 1 + d
N − i− 1
N − 1 ] . (3)
Parameter w ∈ [0, 1] in the last two equations will be referred to as intensity
of selection. For w = 1, we are considering that the game-theoretic pay-off
accounts for the totality of each individual’s fitness, situation considered e.g.
in [20] and [2]. For w = 0, on the contrary, all individuals have the same
fitness, independent of their type. This important particular case is called
neutral. When w is small, we say we are in the weak-selection regime.
In this paper we will consider the following
Hypothesis 1 The intensity of selection w appearing in (2) and (3) does
not depend on the population size N .
In [5] the above hypothesis is explicitly violated and some interesting results
are obtained in the weak-selection regime by exactly choosing the form how
w depends on N . In a further paper [6] the same authors go beyond weak-
selection and present some asymptotic results when N → ∞ using ideas
closely related to the ones in this paper. But their main theorem does not
apply to the case of w independent of N as here.
Returning to (2) and (3), notice that fi and gi in general depend on i,
i.e. on the frequency of A individuals in the population, as usual in game-
theoretic situations. The special case of frequency independent fitnesses,
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typical of Population Genetics, may be recovered taking a = b and c = d in
(1).
Population dynamics is introduced when we allow the frequencies of A
and B to evolve with time. In the Moran process [13], this is modeled by
two independent random choices at each time step: one random individual is
chosen for reproduction and one random individual is chosen for death. We
assume that no mutations occur in reproduction, i.e. that a new individual
with the same type as the reproducing one replaces the dying individual. The
number N of individuals in the population remains constant for all time. The
dying individual is chosen uniformly among the whole population, but the
reproducing individual is chosen with probability proportional to the fitness
of its type.
With the above defined stochastic dynamics, at each time step the number
i of A individuals may increase by 1 (if an A is chosen for reproduction and
a B for death), decrease by 1 (if a B is chosen for reproduction and an A for
death), or remain constant (in the remaining two possible outcomes). The
corresponding transition probabilities, taking into account the reproduction
probabilities proportional to fitnesses, are
Pi→i+1 ≡ αi = i fi
i fi + (N − i) gi
N − i
N
, (4)
Pi→i−1 ≡ βi = (N − i) gi
i fi + (N − i) gi
i
N
, (5)
and
Pi→i = 1− αi − βi .
If we take the number i of A individuals, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}, as the state of
the population, then the state evolves as a Markov chain [1]. States i = 0 and
i = N are absorbing, i.e. the chain will stay forever in such a state if the chain
ever enters it. It can be seen that all the other states i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 are
transient [1]. Fixation, i.e. the chain eventually entering one of the absorbing
states, will happen with probability 1. This is a consequence of Markov chain
theory when the number of states is finite, see e.g. [1].
Let pii be the probability that the process will end up in the state N
(i.e. fixation of type A) given that the initial condition was state i. A
straightforward probabilistic argument leads to a set of difference equations
obeyed by the fixation probabilities
pii = βipii−1 + (1− αi − βi)pii + αipii+1 . (6)
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If we define the discrete derivative of pii as
di = pii − pii−1 , (7)
then (6) can be rewritten as
di+1 = r
−1
i di , (8)
i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, where
ri =
αi
βi
=
fi
gi
(9)
is just the relative fitness of A individuals with respect to B individuals. As
all elements in the pay-off matrix (1) are positive, and w ∈ [0, 1], then ri > 0
for all i.
An exact and explicit formula for pii may be obtained by solving equations
(6), see e.g. [14]. The first step for that is solving (8), obtaining di for
i = 2, 3, . . . , N in terms of d1. Taking into account the boundary conditions
pi0 = 0 and piN = 1 (10)
and the fact that
∑N
i=1 di = piN − pi0 = 1, it can be seen that
pi1 =
1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
(11)
and, for i = 2, . . . , N − 1,
pii =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
. (12)
Although exact and explicit, the above formulas are “unwieldy” [9], unless
fitnesses are independent of frequency. The neutral case is the simplest,
because rk = 1 for all k, and we get immediately
pii =
i
N
. (13)
A mutant of a new kind in an otherwise uniform population may not reach
fixation, even if the mutation is beneficial. In fact, due to the stochastic char-
acter of natural selection, as modeled by the Moran process, the mutant and
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its eventual offspring may be chosen for death in a few time steps. Accord-
ingly, a quantity of interest in Population Genetics is the fixation probability
ρA ≡ pi1 of a single mutant of type A in a population of N − 1 individuals of
type B, and also its analogue ρB ≡ 1−piN−1. For the neutral Moran process,
by (13), we have
ρA = ρB = 1/N . (14)
Classification of the evolutionary scenarios for the Moran process for a
population of types A and B was performed by [20] using the signs of r1− 1,
rN−1 − 1, ρA − 1/N and ρB − 1/N . As stated in the above cited paper, the
former two signs characterize the invasion dynamics, whereas the latter two
characterize replacement dynamics.
For instance, r1 > 1 means that a single A in a population of N − 1
B individuals is fitter than the Bs. In this case we will say that natural
selection favors the invasion of the B population by a single A mutant. Using
a notation introduced in [20] and used again in [2], r1 > 1 is denoted as
B → A.
Not only we are concerned with comparing the fitness of a single mutant
with the rest of the population, but also we will compare the fixation proba-
bility of this mutant with the fixation probability (14) of the mutant in the
neutral case. If ρA > 1/N , then we will say that natural selection favors the
replacement of B by A. The notation for that is B ⇒ A.
Following [20] and also [2], the notation for evolutionary scenarios in the
present paper uses single arrows at the top to refer to invasion dynamics, i.e.
fitness comparisons, and double arrows at the bottom to refer to replacement
dynamics, i.e. fixation probability comparisons with respect to the neutral
case. One example to illustrate: the case r1 > 1, rN−1 < 1, ρA > 1/N ,
ρB < 1/N , i.e., selection favors invasion of B by A and invasion of A by B,
favors replacement of B by A, but opposes replacement of A by B is denoted
as B
→←⇒⇒ A.
Each combination of arrow orientations in the above notation, or, equiv-
alently, each of the sign possibilities for r1 − 1, rN−1 − 1, ρA − 1/N and
ρB − 1/N is defined to be an evolutionary scenario for the Moran process
with two strategies. Sometimes we will also take into account only the top
arrows in the notation and refer to that as an invasion scenario.
Disregarding the exceptional scenarios in which the above quantities may
be null, we have 4 arrows with two possible orientations for each, amounting
to 16 evolutionary scenarios. We consider the following as the most important
9
result in [20]:
Theorem 1 Among the 16 combinatorially possible evolutionary scenarios
for the Moran process with two strategies, only 8 may occur:
B
→→⇒⇒ A and B ←←⇐⇐ A , (15)
B
→←⇒⇒ A ,B →←⇐⇐ A and B →←⇒⇐ A , (16)
and finally
B
←→⇒⇒ A,B ←→⇐⇐ A and B ←→⇐⇒ A . (17)
A new proof of this result, simpler than the one in [20], can be found in
A.1.
3 Graph shapes
We start with two simple auxiliary results.
Lemma 1 The relative fitness defined by (9) is either a monotonic function
of i, or it is independent of i.
We leave to the reader the easy proof of the above result. It suffices
to take the derivative of (9) with respect to i and notice that its sign is
independent of i.
Lemma 2 If di > 1/N for all i > j and pij ≥ jN , then pii > iN for all i > j.
Proof Notice that if i > j, then pii can be written as a telescopic sum
pii = pij + dj+1 + · · ·+ di .
By the hypotheses, the first term in the right-hand side is not smaller than
j/N and all the i − j remaining terms are larger than 1/N . It follows that
pii > j/N +
i−j
N
= i/N . 
We consider now the graph shape of the fixation probability in scenario
B
←←⇐⇐ A. As the notation suggests, in this case B dominates A. From
the point of view of the invasion dynamics, this is a simple consequence of
Lemma 1. In fact, because r1 < 1 and rN−1 < 1, then no matter whether
ri is increasing, decreasing or constant, we must have ri < 1 for all i. This
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means that B is fitter than A no matter the frequency of A in the population.
On the other hand, this fact does not automatically mean that the fixation
probability of A is smaller than in the neutral case (13) for all frequencies of
A. The double arrows in B ⇐⇐ A mean ρA < 1/N and ρB > 1/N , which
imply that for i = 1 and i = N − 1 we have indeed pii < i/N . That this
relation holds for all other values of i is part of the content of the following
Proposition.
Proposition 1 In scenario B
←←⇐⇐ A we have pii < i/N for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N−
1}. Moreover the discrete derivative di = pii − pii−1 is an increasing function
of i.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in A.2.1. Figure 1 illustrates some graph shapes
with the characteristics proved in the above result.
If, instead of focusing on the fixation probability of A, we consider the
fixation probability of B, then we are led to define pii the fixation probability
of type B when the initial number of B individuals in the population is i. Of
course,
pii = 1− piN−i . (18)
Using this duality, the reader may prove a result similar to Proposition 1
above for the scenario B
→→⇒⇒ A:
Proposition 2 In scenario B
→→⇒⇒ A we have pii > i/N for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N−
1}. Moreover the discrete derivative di = pii − pii−1 is a decreasing function
of i.
Let us now consider the three evolutionary scenarios in Theorem 1 when
the invasion scenario is B →← A, i.e. those in (16). Their graph shapes are
characterized by the following
Proposition 3 If the invasion scenario is B →← A, there exists a single
i∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1} such that di+1 < di for i < i∗, di+1 > di for i > i∗ and
di∗+1 ≥ di∗.
In scenario B
→←⇒⇐ A there exists a single i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 2} such that
pii ≥ i/N for i < i and pii < i/N for i ≥ i.
In scenarios B
→←⇒⇒ A and B →←⇐⇐ A we respectively have pii > i/N and
pii < i/N for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}.
11
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Figure 1: Plot of the fixation probability of A as a function of the initial
fraction i/N of A individuals in the population for two values of the popu-
lation size. The neutral case graph pii = i/N is shown for comparison. The
pay-off matrix elements are a = 1, b = 1.1, c = 1.1 and d = 1.2 and the
selection intensity is w = 1. For both values N = 50 and N = 100 it is easy
to check that r1 < 1 and rN−1 < 1. From the graphs it is seen that conditions
ρA < 1/N and ρB > 1/N are fulfilled, so that the evolutionary scenario is
B
←←⇐⇐ A.
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Figure 2: Plot of the fixation probability of A as a function of the initial frac-
tion i/N of A individuals in the population for two values of the population
size. The neutral case graph pii = i/N is shown for comparison. The pay-off
matrix elements are a = 2, b = 2.1, c = 2.2 and d = 1.85 and the selection
intensity is w = 1. For both values N = 50 and N = 250 it is easy to check
that r1 > 1 and rN−1 < 1. For N = 50 we have ρA > 1/N and ρB > 1/N and
the evolutionary scenario is B
→←⇒⇐ A. But for N = 250 we have ρA > 1/N
and ρB < 1/N , so that the evolutionary scenario is B
→←⇒⇒ A.
Notice that i∗ is a point at which the discrete derivative changes its decreasing
behavior to an increasing behavior. We may define i∗ to be an inflection
point. Proposition 3 proves existence and uniqueness of an inflection point
for the graph in all three scenarios (16). On the other hand, i is a point
where the graph of the fixation probability crosses the neutral line. It exists
only in scenario B
→←⇒⇐ A and is unique. The proof of these statements
is in A.2.2. The graphs in Figure 2 illustrate the shape for two among the
scenarios B →← A. An example for the remaining scenario may be obtained
by exchanging types A and B in the pay-off matrix in the Figure.
Finally, for the invasion scenarios B ←→ A in (17), the graph shapes are
determined by the following result, analogous to Proposition 3. In all cases
there is a single inflection point i∗ and only in B ←→⇐⇒ A the graph crosses the
neutral line, but only once. The proof is omitted, because it follows the same
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Figure 3: Plot of the fixation probability of A as a function of the initial
fraction i/N of A individuals in the population for two values of the popu-
lation size. The neutral case graph pii = i/N is shown for comparison. The
pay-off matrix elements are a = 2.3, b = 1.89, c = 2.2 and d = 2.1 and the
selection intensity is w = 1. For both values N = 100 and N = 300 it is easy
to check that r1 < 1 and rN−1 > 1. For N = 100 we have ρA < 1/N and
ρB > 1/N and the evolutionary scenario is B
←→⇐⇐ A. But for N = 300 we
have ρA < 1/N and ρB < 1/N , so that the evolutionary scenario is B
←→⇐⇒ A.
ideas of the proof of the analogous Proposition 3. The shapes are illustrated
in Figure 3.
Proposition 4 If the invasion scenario is B ←→ A, there exists a single
i∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1} such that di+1 > di for i < i∗, di+1 < di for i > i∗ and
di∗+1 ≤ di∗.
In scenario B
←→⇐⇒ A there exists a single i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 2} such that
pii ≤ i/N for i < i and pii > i/N for i ≥ i.
In scenarios B
←→⇐⇐ A and B ←→⇒⇒ A we respectively have pii < i/N and
pii > i/N for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}.
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4 Large population asymptotics: statement
of the problem
From now on, we will consider the behavior of the fixation probabilities pii
when both the population size N and the number of A individuals i tend to
infinity, but with the fraction x = i/N held fixed. For this sake, we define
for x ∈ [0, 1]
ΠN(x) = pi[Nx] . (19)
We start with the exact formula (12). Defining
`j = −
j∑
k=1
1
N
log rk , (20)
we may rewrite (12) as
pii =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1 e
N`j
1 +
∑N−1
j=1 e
N`j
. (21)
Using (2) and (3) in (9), it is easy to see that
r[Nx]
N→∞−→ R(y) , (22)
where
R(y) ≡ 1− w + w[ay + b(1− y)]
1− w + w[cy + d(1− y)] (23)
and y = [Nx]/N = x+ δ, with δ being a remainder term with |δ| ≤ 1/(2N).
In order to avoid such remainders and some small, but non-negligible, effects
they have when multiplied by N , when necessary we will demand that the
fraction x of A individuals in the population is in QN0 for some N0 ∈ N and
also that the limit of infinite population N → ∞ is taken with N being a
multiple of N0.
Observe that, due to (22), when N is large enough, the signs of r1−1 and
R(0) − 1 are the same, as well as the signs of rN−1 − 1 and R(1) − 1. This
means that for large enough N the invasion scenario part (i.e. the upper
arrows) in the classification of evolutionary scenarios in Theorem 1 can be
rephrased in terms of the signs of R(0)− 1 and R(1)− 1.
15
The reader should also notice that a straightforward analogue of Lemma
1 holds for the above defined function R, because its derivative R′ is either
strictly positive, or strictly negative in [0, 1].
Because we will need it afterwards, we make now more precise some
duality arguments we had already hinted at in (18). More precisely, we
define a = d, b = c, c = b and d = a and a new pay-off matrix
P =
(
a b
c d
)
=
(
d c
b a
)
(24)
which interchanges A and B individuals. Let pii denote the fixation proba-
bility for B individuals when the initial number of Bs is i. The relationship
between pi and pi is (18). Of course we may also calculate pii by
pii =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1 e
N`j
1 +
∑N−1
j=1 e
N`j
, (25)
where rj and `j are defined as rj and `j by replacing the pay-offs a, b, c and
d by their barred counterparts. It is easy to see that rj = 1/rN−j. Defining
R(y) ≡ 1− w + w[ay + b(1− y)]
1− w + w[cy + d(1− y)] , (26)
it also holds that
R(y) =
1
R(y)
, (27)
where y = 1− y.
Returning to (20), we see that the sum its right hand side is approximately
a Riemann sum, which converges when N →∞ to an integral. We may then
write the approximation
`j ≈ L( j
N
)
where
L(x) ≡ −
∫ x
0
logR(t) dt . (28)
The above defined integral, if multiplied by N and another constant, is ex-
actly the fitness potential defined in [6]. Due to positivity of a, b, c and d,
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L is a C∞ function on [0, 1]. The integral may be calculated exactly, but we
need not do that. Returning to (21), it becomes, on using the approximation,
pii ≈
1 +
∑i−1
j=1 e
NL(j/N)
1 +
∑N−1
j=1 e
NL(j/N)
. (29)
Notice that for large N the sums in the numerator and in the denominator
of the preceding formula are dominated by the values of j close to the values
in which L is maximum. As we shall see, which values of j maximize L(j/N)
depends on which among the four possibilities for the signs of R(0)− 1 and
R(1)− 1 we are in.
[2] used (29) above as if it were exact and obtained asymptotic results
when N → ∞. Technically, what we will do is a version for sums of the
Laplace method, see e.g. [18], for asymptotic evaluation of certain integrals,
resulting in a rigorous version of the results of the above authors.
First of all, we define
si =
{
1, i = 1
1 +
∑i−1
j=1 e
N`j , i = 2, 3, . . . , N
, (30)
so that
ρA = pi1 =
1
sN
(31)
and
ΠN(x) =
s[Nx]
sN
. (32)
We will proceed by obtaining asymptotic formulae as N →∞ for the numer-
ator and denominator of the above formula. Instead of the approximations
which led to (29), let us now write exact expressions for the numerator and
denominator in (32), separating them in parts we are able to estimate.
Both numerator and denominator may be rewritten as
s[Nx] = 1 +
[Nx]−1∑
j=1
eNL(
j
N
) +
[Nx]−1∑
j=1
eNL(
j
N
)
[
eN(`j−L(
j
N
)) − 1
]
(33)
= 1 + sc[Nx] + s
m
[Nx] ,
where
sc[Nx] =
[Nx]−1∑
j=1
eNL(
j
N
)
[
eN(`j−L(
j
N
)) − 1
]
(34)
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and
sm[Nx] =
[Nx]−1∑
j=1
eNL(
j
N
) . (35)
The sm[Nx] term is the “main” contribution to s[Nx], the one considered in
[2]. The term sc[Nx], on the other hand, is due to having replaced `j by its
continuous approximation L( j
N
). It is an instance of what we have called
“continuation error” in Section 1.
Before we embark in studying the asymptotics for the fixation probabil-
ities in the particular invasion scenarios, we introduce a result which will
be useful in dealing with the continuation error terms. At first, one could
naively think that they tend to 0 as N →∞, because `j − L(j/N) tends to
0 in this limit. But we cannot conclude that the term between brackets in
(34) tends to 0. In fact, we can show that N(`j −L( jN )) is bounded and has
a nonzero limit when N →∞. More precisely:
Proposition 5 Let
Q(x) =
1
2
log
R(0)
R(x)
− w q(x) , (36)
where
q(x) =
∫ x
0
[
d
1− w + w(ct+ d(1− t)) −
a
1− w + w(at+ b(1− t))
]
dt .
(37)
Let also x ∈ [0, 1] ∩ QN0 for some N0 ∈ N. If N = mN0, m ∈ N, then
N(`[Nx] − L(x)) converges as m→∞ to Q(x).
The proof for the above Proposition can be seen in A.3.2.
We will start the analysis of the particular invasion scenarios by the co-
ordination game scenario B ←→ A. It will be seen that this is the most
difficult scenario, because it is the only one in which the maximum of L
occurs at an interior point of [0, 1].
5 The coordination case B ←→ A
For large enough N , B ←→ A is characterized by R(0) < 1 and R(1) > 1.
Because, as already remarked, the derivative of R has a fixed sign in [0, 1], R
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must then be an increasing function in this scenario. As a consequence, the
function L defined by (28) must have a maximum at the point x∗ at which R
passes through the value 1. Of course, L′(x∗) = 0 and L′′(x∗) = −R′(x∗) < 0.
Let J∗ = [Nx∗] and
δN = Nx
∗ − J∗ , (38)
so that |δN | ≤ 1/2.
We will split both numerator and denominator in (32) as in (33). We
will start by estimating the main part smN of the denominator, that may be
written as in (35) with x = 1. As J∗ < N , for large enough N we may
separate the sum defining sN into the term with j = J
∗ and the terms with
j < J∗ and j > J∗. If we change summation indices in the latter two, we get
smN = e
NL(x∗)
[
eN(L(
J∗
N
)−L(x∗)) +
J∗−1∑
k=1
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) +
N−J∗−1∑
k=1
eN(L(
J∗+k
N
)−L(x∗))
]
. (39)
The first term inside the brackets in (39) is irrelevant in the limit N →∞
when compared with the other two. In fact, the latter two will be seen to
tend to ∞, whereas the former tends to 1 in the same limit. This is true
because, by using (38), we have
L(
J∗
N
) = L(x∗ − δN
N
) .
Using a second-degree Taylor polynomial with a remainder in Lagrange form,
we may write
L(x∗ − k + δN
N
) = L(x∗) − 1
2!
R′(x∗)
(k + δN)
2
N2
(40)
− 1
3!
L′′′(x∗ − αN k + δN
N
)
(k + δN)
3
N3
,
where αN is some number in (0, 1) and we also used that L
′(x∗) = 0 and
L′′(x∗) = −R′(x∗). Setting k = 0, it follows that
N(L(
J∗
N
)− L(x∗)) = −R
′(x∗)
2N
δ2N −
L′′′(x∗ − αN δN
N
)
6N2
δ3N .
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Our claim that eN(L(
J∗
N
)−L(x∗)) tends to 1 as N →∞ follows then as a conse-
quence of the boundedness of L′′′ in [0, 1] and the fact that |δN | ≤ 1/2.
Due to L′′(x∗) being negative, i.e. the approximate symmetry around a
quadratic maximum, then the last two terms inside the square brackets in
(39) will be shown to be asymptotically equal to each other when N → ∞.
In Theorem 2, one of our most important results, we will calculate their
asymptotic limits.
Theorem 2 In scenario B ←→ A,
smN
N→∞∼
(
2piN
R′(x∗)
) 1
2
eNL(x
∗) . (41)
Proof Using expression (39) for smN we have already proved that the first
term in the square brackets tends to 1. The result will follow by proving that
J∗−1∑
k=1
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) N→∞∼ 1
2
(
2piN
R′(x∗)
) 1
2
and also
N−J∗−1∑
k=1
eN(L(
J∗+k
N
)−L(x∗)) N→∞∼ 1
2
(
2piN
R′(x∗)
) 1
2
.
The proof for both asymptotic formulae above is the same. We will detail it
for the first one.
As we are looking at the limit N →∞ and J∗ is O(N), we may suppose
that N is so large that J∗ > N2/3 + 1. We write
J∗−1∑
k=1
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) =
[N2/3]∑
k=1
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) +
J∗−1∑
k=[N2/3]+1
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) .
By Taylor expanding around x∗, we can see that the exponentN(L(J
∗−k
N
)−
L(x∗)) may be approximated for small k by −R′(x∗)
2N
k2. Then
J∗−1∑
k=1
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) =
∞∑
k=1
e−
R′(x∗)
2N
k2 −
∞∑
k=[N2/3]+1
e−
R′(x∗)
2N
k2
+
[N2/3]∑
k=1
[
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) − e−R
′(x∗)
2N
k2
]
+
J∗−1∑
k=[N2/3]+1
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) ,
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where, as R′(x∗) > 0 all the series above are convergent.
We will provide asymptotic estimates for each of the four terms in the
right-hand side of the last expression. All of them will involve exchanging the
sums for integrals using the Euler-Maclaurin formula, Theorem 7 in A.3.1,
see also [3]. These intermediate results are all proved in A.3.3.
The first sum will be dealt with in Proposition 6 and will be shown to be
O(N1/2), being the only term giving a non-zero asymptotic contribution. The
second and fourth sums are very similar, because in both terms the exponent
is quadratic in k and negligible for k = O(N2/3) or larger. In Proposition 7
we prove that both terms tend to 0 when N →∞. The third sum is the error
term appearing when we replace L(J
∗−k
N
)− L(x∗) by the first non-zero term
in its Taylor expansion. We will show in Proposition 8 that it is bounded,
thus negligible with respect to the first sum, when N →∞. 
The continuation error term scN included in the denominator of (32) may
be asymptotically estimated using the same ideas as in Theorem 2. Of course
the sum in (34) with x = 1 is also dominated by the values of j close to Nx∗,
but the term within square brackets in that formula will yield an eQ(x
∗) − 1,
according to Proposition 5. The result is
Theorem 3 If the invasion scenario is B ←→ A, then
scN
N→∞∼
(
2piN
R′(x∗)
) 1
2
(eQ(x
∗) − 1) eNL(x∗) . (42)
As the ideas used in the proof of this result are a mere repetition of the
ones used in proving Theorem 2, we will not present them.
Having asymptotically estimated both nontrivial terms in the denomi-
nator of (32), we must now consider the numerator in the same expression,
which may also be decomposed in its main and continuation error parts as in
(33). We will assume that the point x in which we want to estimate ΠN(x)
is in QN0 for some N0 and that N is a multiple of N0. According to whether
x < x∗ or x > x∗ we have different situations regarding the value of the sum-
mation index j such that L( j
N
) is maximum. The final result of combining
numerator and denominator of (32) in scenario B ←→ A, considering all
cases for x, is assembled in the following result:
Theorem 4 Define
ΘN(x) =
1
1−R(x)
√
R(x)R′(x∗)
2pi
e−w(q(x)−q(x
∗)) e
N(L(x)−L(x∗))
N1/2
. (43)
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If the invasion scenario is B ←→ A, x ∈ QN0 for some N0 and N is a
multiple of N0, then
ΠN(x) ∼
{
ΘN(x), if x < x
∗
1 + ΘN(x), if x > x
∗ . (44)
Moreover,
ρA ∼
(
R′(x∗)
2piR(0)N
) 1
2
e−wq(x
∗) e−NL(x
∗) (45)
and
ρB ∼
(
R′(x∗)R(1)
2piN
) 1
2
e−w(q(x
∗)−q(1)) e−N(L(x
∗)−L(1)) . (46)
Proof The sum of contributions estimated in Theorems 2 and 3 gives us
sN
N→∞∼
(
2piN
R′(x∗)
) 1
2
eQ(x
∗) eNL(x
∗)
=
(
2piR(0)N
R′(x∗)
) 1
2
e−wq(x
∗) eNL(x
∗) . (47)
If x < x∗, then L is increasing in [0, x] and the maximum of L(j/N)
among the summands in (34) and (35) occurs at j = Nx − 1. Moreover, L′
is positive at this maximum. We have
smNx =
Nx−1∑
j=1
eNL(
j
N
) = eNL(x)
Nx−1∑
k=1
eN(L(x−
k
N
)−L(x)) .
Using the Taylor expansion of L centered at x, we see that the leading con-
tribution to N(L(x− k
N
)− L(x)) is −kL′(x) = k logR(x). This suggests us
to write
smNx = e
NL(x)
{ ∞∑
k=1
R(x)k −
∞∑
k=Nx
R(x)k
+
Nx−1∑
k=1
R(x)k
[
eN(L(x−
k
N
)−L(x))−k logR(x) − 1
]}
.
As x < x∗, then 0 < R(x) < 1 and the first term inside the curly braces in
the expression above is a convergent geometric series with sum R(x)
1−R(x) . The
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second term is also a convergent geometric series and can be easily seen to
tend to 0 when N → ∞. Proposition 9 in A.3.3 shows that the third term
also tends to 0 when N →∞. We have thus proved that for x < x∗,
smNx ∼
R(x)
1−R(x) e
NL(x) . (48)
With a similar reasoning, and using again Proposition 5, we have
scNx ∼
R(x)
1−R(x) (e
Q(x) − 1) eNL(x) . (49)
Summing the above two results and dividing by (47), we get, for x < x∗,
ΠN(x) ∼ ΘN(x).
Let now x > x∗. Of course the maximum of L(j/N) occurs now at
j = [Nx∗], not at j = Nx − 1, and all the above calculations break down.
To obtain the asymptotic formula for ΠN(x) we resort to duality arguments.
If x = 1 − x and x∗ = 1 − x∗, then x > x∗ implies x < x∗ and we have
ΠN(x) ∼ ΘN(x), where a formula for ΘN(x) can be obtained by substituting
in (43) R(x) by R(x), L(x) by L(x), and so on.
But ΠN(x) = 1−ΠN(x). So, for x > x∗ we may write ΠN(x) ∼ 1−ΘN(x).
If in this formula we write all the barred quantities in terms of their unbarred
counterparts, using relations such as (27), we get the second line in (44).
Formula (45) is obtained by using (47) and ρA = 1/sN . If we use duality
arguments in (45) we get (46). 
Results (45) and (46) had already appeared at Table 2 in [2], but with a
wrong numerical factor due to these authors having neglected the continua-
tion error terms. The more general (44) does not appear there.
In Figure 4 we compare for N = 1000 the numerically computed graph of
ΠN and its asymptotic approximation given by the right-hand side of (44).
We see that when x is far from x∗ the two graphs are indistinguishable.
Observe that when x is close to x∗ the asymptotic approximation is not only
far from good, but not even it yields values in [0, 1].
A better comparison between ΠN and its asymptotic approximation is
shown in Figure 5 for several values of N . It can be seen that for x far from
x∗ the approximation is really good and that the region around x∗ in which
it fails decreases as N is increased.
More than a mere approximation scheme, Theorem 4 has the following
interesting consequence:
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Figure 4: Plots of the fixation probability of A as a function of the initial
fraction x of A individuals in the population for N = 1000 (continuous
line) and its asymptotic approximation given by the right-hand side of (44)
(dashed). The pay-off matrix elements are a = 2.3, b = 1.89, c = 2.2 and
d = 2.1 and the selection intensity is w = 1. For this particular matrix, the
value of x∗ is approximately 0.68. The invasion scenario is B ←→ A.
24
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
10-17
10-12
10-7
0.01
x
ab
so
lu
te
di
ffe
re
nc
e
N=100
N=200
N=1000
Figure 5: Plots for several values of N of the absolute difference between
the fixation probability of A and its asymptotic approximation given by the
right-hand side of (44). Notice the logarithmic scale on the vertical axis. The
pay-off matrix elements are a = 2.3, b = 1.89, c = 2.2 and d = 2.1 and the
selection intensity is w = 1. For this particular matrix, the value of x∗ is
approximately 0.68. The invasion scenario is B ←→ A.
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Corollary 1 If the invasion scenario is B ←→ A, then for large enough N
scenarios B
←→⇒⇒ A and B ←→⇐⇐ A are ruled out.
Proof Notice that for x ∈ [0, 1], x 6= x∗, L(x) < L(x∗). Then, for fixed w
and x 6= x∗, ΘN(x) N→∞→ 0. By (44), this means that ΠN(x) tends to 0 if
x < x∗ and to 1 if x > x∗. According to Proposition 4, the only evolutionary
scenario compatible with this is B
←→⇐⇒ A. 
Figure 3 illustrates for a given pay-off matrix the disappearance of sce-
nario B
←→⇐⇐ A and its substitution for B ←→⇐⇒ A as the value of N is
increased. The importance of the Corollary above is that it reconciles the
large N behavior of the Moran process with the deterministic solution of the
replicator equation which, in case B ←→ A, says that B will be fixated if
the initial condition is x < x∗ and that A will be fixated if x > x∗.
6 The remaining invasion scenarios
Consider at first, scenario B →← A, characterized, for large enough N , by
R(0) > 1 and R(1) < 1. In this case, R is a decreasing function in [0, 1]. L
has an interior minimum at the point x∗ at which R passes through the value
1, but we already know that what dominates the scenario is the maximum of
L in [0, 1]. This maximum will be at 0 if L(1) < 0 and at 1 if L(1) > 0. Of
course it may also happen that L(1) = 0, but we will not consider this non
generic case. As the derivative L′ does not vanish at the maximum point,
the situation will be quite similar to what we found when estimating sNx
for x < x∗ in the proof of Theorem 4. The next result synthesizes what we
know.
Theorem 5 If the invasion scenario is B →← A, x ∈ (0, 1)∩QN0 for some
N0 and N is a multiple of N0, then
ΠN(x)
N→∞→
{
0, if L(1) > 0
1, if L(1) < 0
. (50)
As a consequence, for large enough N the evolutionary scenario must be
B
→←⇐⇐ A if L(1) > 0, B →←⇒⇒ A if L(1) < 0. Scenario B →←⇒⇐ A is ruled
out unless L(1) = 0.
Proof Consider at first that L(1) < 0. Then the maximum of L(x) in [0, 1]
occurs at x = 0. We have L′(0) = − logR(0) < 0 and the first order Taylor
26
expansion around 0 with remainder is L(j/N) = − j
N
logR(0)+ j
2
2N2
L′′(αj
j
N
),
with αj ∈ (0, 1). This Taylor expansion suggests writing
smNx =
Nx−1∑
j=1
eNL(j/N)
=
∞∑
j=1
R(0)−j −
∞∑
j=Nx
R(0)−j +
Nx−1∑
j=1
R(0)−j
[
eN(L(j/N)+
j
N
logR(0)) − 1
]
=
1
R(0)− 1(1−R(0)
−Nx) +
Nx−1∑
j=1
R(0)−j
[
e
j2
2N
L′′(αj jN ) − 1
]
.
Using ideas already used in this paper, we see that the last sum tends to 0
when N →∞ and we get
smNx
N→∞→ 1
R(0)− 1 . (51)
Differently of the other case already studied, we obtain a limit independent
of x for smNx. Using again Proposition 5, and the fact that L is maximum at
0, we have scNx → 1R(0)−1(eQ(0) − 1) = 0, because Q(0) = 0.
As the above results hold also for x = 1, the denominator sN in (32)
converges to the same limit as the numerator, proving the second line in
(50).
The first line in (50) is an easy consequence of a reasoning of interchanging
A and B as in the proof of Theorem 4.
Finally, as ΠN(x) is close to 1 for all x > 0, the only compatible scenario
if L(1) < 0, according to Proposition 3, is B
→←⇒⇒ A. An analogous reasoning
proves the statement in case L(1) > 0. 
We observe that, as the continuation error terms in case B →← A are
asymptotically null, then the corresponding results in [2], shown at their
Table 2, are exact.
Figure 2 illustrates for a given pay-off matrix the transformation of sce-
nario B
→←⇒⇐ A for a small value of N to scenario B →←⇒⇒ A as the value of
N is increased.
We like very much the result of Theorem 5, because it seems paradoxical.
If we expected to find, as in Theorem 4, some kind of reconciliation between
the solution of the deterministic replicator equation for the invasion scenario
B →← A and its Moran counterpart for large N , we might be deceived. In
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fact, the deterministic equation gives stable coexistence of A and B, whereas
Theorem 5 gives a criterion, the sign of L(1), to say that either A will fixate
certainly, or B will fixate certainly. This result is here to remind us that not
always we can expect that stochastic systems converge to their deterministic
counterpart as the number of components tends to infinity. We believe that
the true reconciliation between stochasticity and determinism in this case is
the fact that fixation times in the invasion scenario B →← A seem to grow
very quickly with N . Although we present no result on this here, [2] state
that this growth is exponential in N .
The result for the remaining two invasion scenarios is still easier and we
state it without proof:
Theorem 6 If the invasion scenario is B →→ A or B ←← A, x ∈ (0, 1) ∩
QN0 for some N0 and N is a multiple of N0, then
ΠN(x)
N→∞→
{
0, if scenario is B ←← A
1, if scenario is B →→ A . (52)
7 Conclusions and outline
We have provided in this paper a simple theory which exhibits for each of the
eight evolutionary scenarios for the Moran process for two strategies discov-
ered by [20] a characteristic shape for the fixation probability pii. Although
very simple, we had never seen such results before.
In the second part of the paper we showed how these evolutionary sce-
narios behave when the population size N tends to infinity. This had been
done before by [2], but we wanted to provide a rigorous substitute for their
replacement of a sum by an integral, without estimating the error in this
exchange. We saw that this error may be null in some cases, but may also
amount to a multiplicative factor in another case.
One possible continuation of this study might be studying what happens,
if we also take the weak selection limit w → 0 after limit N → ∞. Results
in this direction stressing that the order in which we perform the two limits
is relevant were obtained by [19]. From the point of view of this paper, we
see that as w is made small, function L becomes almost constant and we are
obliged to take larger values of N in order to see the asymptotic behavior
shown here.
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Another natural continuation is studying the extension for fixation times
of the graph shape results and asymptotic behavior when N → ∞. Some
results on that were already obtained by [2].
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We start with the second scenario in (15). We will show that if the invasion
dynamics is B ←← A, then necessarily ρA < 1N and ρB >
1
N
. The invasion
arrows mean that both r1 and rN−1 are smaller than 1. By Lemma 1, regard-
less of the ri being increasing, decreasing or constant, ri < 1 for all i. This
implies
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
i=1 r
−1
i > N − 1. As ρA = pi1, then (11) implies ρA < 1/N .
A formula for ρB similar to (11) may be obtained:
ρB =
1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
i=1 rN−i
.
A reasoning similar to the above shows that due to ri being smaller than 1
for all i implies ρB > 1/N . This proves that the only possible scenario if the
invasion dynamics is B ←← A is B ←←⇐⇐ A. An analogous proof holds for the
first scenario in (15).
Let us now work with the scenarios in (16), in which the upper arrows
mean r1 > 1 > rN−1. In this case, by Lemma 1, the ri are decreasing. Let
` ≡ max{j; rj ≥ 1} and `′ ≡ max{j; rN−j ≤ 1} .
It is clear that 1 ≤ ` ≤ N − 2 and the same for `′. We define recursively Hi
as
H1 =
1
r1
and Hi =
1
ri
Hi−1, for i = 2, 3, . . . , N − 1 .
Analogously, we define H ′i as
H ′1 = rN−1 and H
′
i = rN−iH
′
i, for i = 2, 3, . . . , N − 1 .
Notice that sequences H1, H2, . . . , H` and H
′
1, H
′
2, . . . , H
′
`′ are decreasing,
whereas sequences H`, H`+1, . . . , HN−1 and H ′`′ , H
′
`′+1, . . . , H
′
N−1 are increas-
ing. See also that H1 < 1, H
′
1 < 1, but we do not know whether HN−1 and
H ′N−1 are larger, smaller or equal to 1. If Hi > 1 for some i, then we must
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have HN−1 > 1. If, on the other hand, HN−1 ≤ 1, then Hi ≤ 1 for all i. The
same conclusions are valid for the H ′i. Moreover, the following relation holds
HN−1 =
1
H ′N−1
. (53)
In terms of the new notations, we have
ρA =
1
1 +
∑N−1
i=1 Hi
and ρB =
1
1 +
∑N−1
i=1 H
′
i
. (54)
Suppose now that ρA < 1/N . Then 1/ρA − 1 =
∑N−1
i=1 Hi > N − 1 and
we must have Hi > 1 for some i. As we have already seen, this implies that
HN−1 > 1. By relation (53), we have H ′N−1 < 1 and thus H
′
i < 1 for all
i. This implies
∑N−1
i=1 H
′
i < N − 1 and, by the ρB formula in (54), we get
ρB > 1/N .
We can apply the same reasoning above to show that if r1 > 1 > rN−1
and ρB < 1/N , then ρA > 1/N .
Both reasonings put together show that it is not possible to have both
ρA < 1/N and ρB < 1/N if r1 > 1 > rN−1. In symbols, this means that
scenario B
→←⇐⇒ A is forbidden, proving our assertion about scenarios in (16).
The assertion about scenarios (17) is proved by an analogous argument.
More concretely, we prove that if r1 < 1 < rN−1, then ρA > 1/N and
ρB > 1/N cannot be both true. In symbols, scenario B
←→⇒⇐ A is forbidden.
Notice that in the above proof we showed that some evolutionary scenarios
are forbidden. That all evolutionary scenarios which are not forbidden are
actually permitted is illustrated by examples. Examples in Figure 2 are a
good hint that scenarios B
→←⇒⇐ A and B →←⇒⇒ A are permitted. If the
roles of A and B are exchanged, i.e. if the pay-off matrix for the examples
in Figure 2 is exchanged by P =
(
1.85 2.2
2.1 2.
)
, then we obtain an example
of scenario B
→←⇐⇐ A for N = 250. Similarly, the examples in Figure 3 are
hints that scenarios B
←→⇐⇐ A and B ←→⇐⇒ A do exist. If we exchange A and
B, we obtain also an example for the B
←→⇒⇒ A case.
A.2 Proofs of the graph shape results
Before we start, let us introduce some notation for the proofs.
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First of all, let IN−1 = {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}. The set of points i in IN−1 such
that the fixation probability pii is smaller than the neutral value i/N will be
denoted D. More concretely,
D = {i ∈ IN−1 ; pii < i/N} .
D will then denote a similar set, but replacing the strict inequality by ≤, i.e.
D = {i ∈ IN−1 ; pii ≤ i/N} .
Analogously, we define
U = {i ∈ IN−1 ; pii > i/N}
and
U = {i ∈ IN−1 ; pii ≥ i/N} .
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The scenario hypotheses are r1 < 1, rN−1 < 1, ρA < 1/N and ρB > 1/N .
The former two imply by Lemma 1 that ri < 1 for all i ∈ IN−1. Using (8),
we prove that the discrete derivative is an increasing function.
The latter two imply that pi1 < 1/N and piN−1 < N−1N . Using the bound-
ary conditions in (10) we also have d1 < 1/N and dN > 1/N .
What remains to be proved is that D = IN−1 in this scenario. We know
that 1 ∈ D and N − 1 ∈ D. Suppose that IN−1 \D is not empty, and let j
be its minimum. Then 2 ≤ j ≤ N − 2, pij−1 < j−1N and pij ≥ jN . It follows
that dj > 1/N and, because the derivative is increasing, di > 1/N for i > j.
We may then use Lemma 2 and find that piN−1 > N−1N , which is an absurd
because, as already noticed, we must have piN−1 < N−1N . Then IN−1 \ D is
empty. 
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The arrows in B →← A mean that we have r1 > 1 and rN−1 < 1. It is then
necessary, according to Lemma 1, that ri decreases with i. By continuity,
equation ri = 1 has then a single solution x ∈ (1, N − 1). If we define i∗ to
be the smallest integer larger than or equal to x, then using (8) we prove the
claims related to i∗ in the statement of the proposition.
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Suppose now that the scenario is B
→←⇒⇐ A. The double arrows mean
ρA > 1/N and ρB > 1/N , which imply pi1 > 1/N and piN−1 < N−1N . So 1 ∈ U
and N − 1 ∈ D. As D is non-empty, let i be its minimum. As i ∈ D and
i− 1 ∈ U , then di < 1/N .
We claim that D ⊃ {i, i + 1, . . . , N − 1}. If this is not true, then {i, i +
1, . . . , N − 1} \ D is not empty. Let then j be the smallest element in this
set. We have j > i, pij−1 <
j−1
N
and pij ≥ jN . This implies dj > 1/N . Because
the discrete derivative increased when going from i to j, then j > i∗ + 1.
It follows that dk > 1/N for all k ≥ j and, by Lemma 2, piN−1 > N−1N ,
which contradicts hypothesis ρB > 1/N . Then our claim is proved. As D
cannot contain elements smaller than its minimum i, nor larger than N − 1,
then D = {i, i + 1, . . . , N − 1}, proving what we needed about the scenario
B
→←⇒⇐ A.
Consider now B
→←⇒⇒ A. The double arrows here imply pi1 > 1/N and
piN−1 > N−1N . The latter, together with (10), implies dN < 1/N . What we
want to prove is that D = ∅.
Suppose that D is not empty. Let then j1 and j2 be its minimum and
maximum elements. Because 1 and N−1 are in U , then 1 < j1 ≤ j2 < N−1.
As j1 − 1 ∈ U and j1 ∈ D, then dj1 < 1/N . Similarly, dj2+1 > 1/N . As
the discrete derivative increased between j1 and j2 + 1, then j2 > i
∗. It
follows that dj > 1/N if j ≥ j2 + 1. Together with Lemma 2, this leads to a
contradiction, because we already knew that dN < 1/N .
Finally, the proof for scenario B
→←⇐⇐ A may be obtained from the one
of B
→←⇒⇒ A by using (18). 
A.3 Proofs of some auxiliary results
A.3.1 General results
For completeness sake, we state here the Euler-Maclaurin formula. For a
proof and the definitions of the Bernoulli numbers and periodic functions,
the reader is directed to [3].
Theorem 7 (Euler-Maclaurin formula) For any function f with a con-
tinuous derivative of order 2m + 1 on the interval [0, n], m ≥ 0 and n ∈ N,
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we have
n∑
k=0
f(k) =
∫ n
0
f(x) dx +
1
(2m+ 1)!
∫ n
0
P2m+1(x)f
(2m+1)(x) dx
+
m∑
r=1
B2r
(2r)!
[
f (2r−1)(n)− f (2r−1)(0)] + 1
2
(f(n) + f(0)) ,(55)
where the Pk are the Bernoulli periodic functions and Bk = Pk(1) the Bernoulli
numbers.
The next general result is a generalized form of the Riemann-Lebesgue
lemma appearing in the theory of Fourier series and transform. We state it
here for completeness. Its proof will not be presented, because it is basically
the proof of the standard form of the same result.
Lemma 3 (Generalized Riemann-Lebesgue) Let p be a C1 1-periodic
function with
∫ 1
0
p(x)dx = 0 and f be integrable in [0,∞). Then
lim
t→∞
∫ ∞
0
p(tx) f(x)dx = 0 .
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 5
For x ∈ [0, 1] we may write
N(`[Nx] − L(x)) = N(`[Nx] − L( [Nx]
N
)) +N(L(
[Nx]
N
)− L(x)) .
Notice that | [Nx]
N
− x| ≤ 1
2N
. If we use a Taylor expansion around x, it is
easy to see that if x /∈ QN , then the second term in the above sum may be
estimated as
N(L(
[Nx]
N
)− L(x)) ∼ N( [Nx]
N
− x)L′(x) ,
which is bounded, but in general does not tend to 0 as N → ∞. As al-
ready remarked, in order to simplify things, we may add the hypothesis that
x ∈ QN0 for some N0 and that N is a multiple of N0. With this further
assumption, the term we are referring to is null.
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Continuing, we will then assume that Nx is integer and we write `Nx
instead of `[Nx]. We may split N(`Nx − L(x)) as
N(`Nx−L(x)) = N
[
−
Nx∑
k=1
1
N
(log rk − logR( k
N
)) +
∫ x
0
logR(t)dt − 1
N
Nx∑
k=1
logR(
k
N
)
]
,
where we used (23) and (28).
For the sum of the second and third terms above, we have
N
[ ∫ x
0
logR(t)dt − 1
N
Nx∑
k=1
logR(
k
N
)
]
=
∫ Nx
0
logR(
s
N
)ds −
Nx∑
k=1
logR(
k
N
)
=
1
2
(logR(0)− logR(x)) −
∫ Nx
0
P1(s)
d
ds
logR(
s
N
) ds ,
where we used in the last passage the Euler-Maclaurin formula (55) with
m = 0. By making the substitution u = s
N
in the last integral and using
Lemma 3, we prove that it tends to 0. So, if Nx is an integer,
N
[∫ x
0
logR(t)dt − 1
N
Nx∑
k=1
logR(
k
N
)
]
N→∞→ 1
2
(logR(0)− logR(x)) .
The remaining term −∑Nxk=1(log rk − logR( kN )) in the above expression
for N(`Nx − L(x)) can be rewritten by using the definitions (9) for rk and
(23) for R( k
N
). The difference rk −R( kN ) is
rk−R( k
N
) =
1
N
d[1− w + w(a k
N
+ b(1− k
N
))]− a[1− w + w(c k
N
+ d(1− k
N
))]
[1− w + w(c k
N
+ d(1− k
N
))]2
+O(
1
N2
) .
We may then use the Taylor expansion of the logarithm to find
log rk − logR( k
N
) =
=
w
N
(
d
1− w + w(c k
N
+ d(1− k
N
))
− a
1− w + w(a k
N
+ b(1− k
N
))
)
+ O(
1
N2
) .
Summing the above expression for k running from 1 to Nx, the first terms
become a Riemann sum that converges when N →∞ to the integral wq(x),
whereas the sum of the O(1/N2) terms of course tends to 0.
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A.3.3 Proofs of some results appearing in Theorems 2 and 4
We start with the result leading to the only asymptotically non-vanishing
contributions for
∑N−1
j=1 e
NL( j
N
), as in the proof of Theorem 2. In fact, these
contributions are obtained by just putting a = R′(x∗) in the result below:
Proposition 6 Let a > 0. Then, for any non-negative integer m,
∞∑
k=0
e−
a
N
k2 =
1
2
(
piN
a
) 1
2
+
1
2
+ o(N−m) . (56)
Proof Take f(x) = e−
a
N
x2 in (55). We may also take n = ∞ in the same
formula, because the improper integrals converge and so do the limits at
infinity of f and its derivatives, all equal to 0. The odd-ordered derivatives
of f at 0 all vanish, too. The Euler-Maclaurin formula gives us then, in this
case,
∞∑
k=0
e−
a
N
k2 =
∫ ∞
0
e−
a
N
x2dx +
1
2
f(0) +
∫ ∞
0
P2m+1(x) f
(2m+1)(x) dx
=
1
2
(
piN
a
) 1
2
+
1
2
+
∫ ∞
0
P2m+1(x) f
(2m+1)(x) dx . (57)
To finish the proof, we use the fact that the Hermite polynomials Hn(x) are
related to the derivatives of e−x
2
by
dn
dxn
e−x
2
= (−1)n e−x2 Hn(x) .
The derivatives of f become
f (n)(x) =
( a
N
)n/2
(−1)n e− aN x2 Hn(
√
a
N
x) .
Substituting this expression in the remaining integral in (57), performing the
change of variables u =
√
a
N
x and using Lemma 3, the result is proved. 
Proposition 6 tells us that exchanging the sum in the left-hand side of
(56) by the corresponding integral produces an error very close to 1/2. The
difference between this error and 1/2 is so small that for any m > 0, this
difference multiplied by Nm still tends to 0. For the sake of proving Theorem
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2, m = 1 would be enough, but our result is so remarkable that we could not
help stating it in its full generality.
In the next lemma we prove some asymptotic estimates – obtained also
by the Euler-Maclaurin formula – necessary for proving Theorem 2.
Lemma 4 (i) Let a > 0 and A ∈ N be such that A2
N
N→∞→ ∞. Then
∞∑
k=A
e−
a
N
k2 N→∞∼
(
1
2
N
a
A−1 + 1
)
e−
a
N
A2 . (58)
(ii) If p is an odd positive integer, then
∞∑
k=1
kp e−
a
N
k2 N→∞∼ 1
2
(
p− 1
2
)!
(
N
a
) p+1
2
. (59)
Proof In order to prove (58) we use (55), again with f(x) = e−
a
N
x2 and
n =∞, but now we take m = 0. It gives us
∞∑
k=A
e−
a
N
k2 =
∫ ∞
A
e−
a
N
x2 dx +
∫ ∞
A
P1(x)
d
dx
e−
a
N
x2 dx +
1
2
e−
a
N
A2 . (60)
For the first integral in the above expression, by a simple change of vari-
able we have∫ ∞
A
e−
a
N
x2 dx =
1
2
(
N
a
)1/2 ∫ ∞
aA2
N
y−1/2 e−y dy =
1
2
(
N
a
)1/2
Γ(
1
2
,
aA2
N
) ,
where Γ(s, x) ≡ ∫∞
x
ys−1 e−ydy is the complementary (or upper) incomplete
Gamma function. It is known that [18] Γ(s, x)
x→∞∼ xs−1e−x. Then∫ ∞
A
e−
a
N
x2 dx
N→∞∼ 1
2
N
a
A−1 e−
a
N
A2 .
For the second integral in the right-hand side of (60), we remind that
|P1(x)| ≤ 1/2 for all x ∈ R. Thus∣∣∣∣∫ ∞
A
P1(x)
d
dx
e−
a
N
x2 dx
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12
∫ ∞
A
2a
N
x e−
a
N
x2 dx =
1
2
e−
a
N
A2 .
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Putting together the expressions for both integrals, we obtain (58).
For proving (59) we use again (55) with m = 0, now with f(x) = xpe−
a
N
x2 .
We get
∞∑
k=1
kp e−
a
N
k2 =
∞∑
k=0
kp e−
a
N
k2 =
∫ ∞
0
xp e−
a
N
x2 dx +
∫ ∞
0
P1(x) f
′(x) dx +
1
2
f(0)
=
1
2
(
N
a
) p+1
2
Γ(
p+ 1
2
) +
∫ ∞
0
P1(x) f
′(x) dx .
Explicitly calculating f ′(x) and using again |P1(x)| ≤ 1/2, the integral in the
right-hand side may be easily bounded by a sum of two terms, both of them
being O(Np/2), thus negligible with respect to the first term in the right-hand
side of the above formula. Using that Γ(p+1
2
) = (p−1
2
)! for odd p takes us to
the result. 
The next result proves that two of the terms appearing in the proof of
Theorem 2 vanish asymptotically.
Proposition 7 Both terms
∞∑
k=[N2/3]+1
e−
R′(x∗)
2N
k2
and
J∗−1∑
k=[N2/3]+1
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗))
appearing in the proof of Theorem 2 tend to 0 when N →∞.
Proof
Using a = R
′(x∗)
2
and A = [N2/3] + 1 in (58), we see that
∞∑
k=[N2/3]+1
e−
R′(x∗)
2N
k2 N→∞→ 0 .
We proceed now to show that
∑J∗−1
k=[N2/3]+1 e
N(L(J
∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) tends to 0
when N →∞. In fact, in scenario B ←→ A we know that L′′(x) = −R′(x)
R(x)
<
0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Letting −M ≡ maxx∈[0,1] L′′(x), then M > 0. Using
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a Taylor formula with Lagrange remainder, we know that there exists ξk
between x∗ and J
∗−k
N
such that
N(L(
J∗ − k
N
)− L(x∗)) = N
2
L′′(ξk)
(
J∗ − k
N
− x∗
)2
≤ −M
2N
(k + δN)
2 ,
where we have used (38) and the above definition of M . As δN ≥ −1/2, we
have
J∗−1∑
k=[N2/3]+1
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) ≤
J∗−1∑
k=[N2/3]+1
e−
M
2N
(k−1)2 ≤
∞∑
k=[N2/3]
e−
M
2N
k2 .
We may now use (58) again and our claim follows. 
One last term remains to be controlled in order to complete the proof of
Theorem 2. We do so in
Proposition 8 The term
[N2/3]∑
k=1
[
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) − e−R
′(x∗)
2N
k2
]
appearing in the proof of Theorem 2 is bounded when N →∞.
Proof Notice first that J
∗−k
N
= x∗ − k+δN
N
. Using the Taylor expansion
(40), we may rewrite
[N2/3]∑
k=1
[
eN(L(
J∗−k
N
)−L(x∗)) − e−R
′(x∗)
2N
k2
]
=
[N2/3]∑
k=1
e−
R′(x∗)
2N
k2
{
e−
R′(x∗)
2N
[(k+δN )
2−k2]− L
′′′(x∗−αk(k+δN )
N
)
6N2
(k+δN )
3 − 1
}
,
where αk is some number between 0 and 1. We now use that for any a > 0,
|eθ − 1| ≤ e
a − 1
a
|θ| , (61)
if |θ| ≤ a. If we take
θ = −R
′(x∗)
2N
[(k + δN)
2 − k2] − L
′′′(x∗ − αk(k+δN )
N
)
6N2
(k + δN)
3
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and M ′ = maxx∈[0,1] |L′′′(x)|, then
|θ| ≤ R
′(x∗)
2N
|2δNk + δ2N | +
M ′
6N2
k3 |1 + δN
k
|3
≤ R
′(x∗)
8N
+
R′(x∗)
2N
k +
(
3
2
)3
M ′
6N2
k3 ,
where in the last passage we used that |δN | ≤ 1/2. As k ≤ N2/3 in the sum
we want to estimate, there exists a constant C independent of N such that
|θ| < C if k ≤ N2/3.
By (61), we obtain that∣∣∣∣∣e−R′(x∗)2N [(k+δN )2−k2] + L′′′(x∗−
αkδN
N
)
6N2
(k+δN )
3 − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ eC − 1C |θ|
≤ e
C − 1
C
(
R′(x∗)
8N
+
R′(x∗)
2N
k +
9M ′
16N2
k3
)
.
Substituting this bound and using (56) and (59), both with p = 1 and p = 3,
finishes the proof. 
This last result appears in the proof of Theorem 4.
Proposition 9 If the invasion scenario is B ←→ A and x < x∗, then
Nx−1∑
k=1
R(x)k
[
eN(L(x−
k
N
)−L(x))−k logR(x) − 1
]
N→∞→ 0 .
Proof By using for L(x − k
N
) a Taylor expansion up to order 1 around x
with Lagrange remainder, then
N(L(x− k
N
)− L(x))− k logR(x) = k
2
2N
L′′(x− αk k
N
)
for some αk ∈ (0, 1). If we use that L′′ is negative in [0, 1] and for θ < 0 we
have |eθ − 1| < |θ|, then∣∣∣∣∣
Nx−1∑
k=1
R(x)k
[
eN(L(x−
k
N
)−L(x))−k logR(x) − 1
]∣∣∣∣∣ < M2N
Nx−1∑
k=1
k2R(x)k ,
where M = maxy∈[0,1] |L′′(y)|. As the latter sum converges if we exchange
the upper limit by ∞, the proposition is proved. 
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